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Abstract—Although it is common for users to select bad passwords that can be easily cracked by attackers and many decades have
been invested in researching alternative authentication methods, password-based authentication remains arguably the most
widely-used method of authentication today. Even if password use ever becomes negligible in the future, password-based
authentication is currently so pervasive that the transition to new authentication methods is likely be very long and complicated. Until
that happens, to encourage users to select good passwords, enterprises often enforce policies, for example, by requiring passwords to
meet minimal length and contain special characters. Such policies have been proven to be ineffectual in practice, and despite all the
available tools and related ongoing research, stolen user credentials are often cracked by attackers before victims get a chance to
react properly. Also, researchers and practitioners often use the notions of password complexity and strength interchangeably, which
only adds to the confusion users may have with respect to password selection. Accurate assessment of a password’s resistance to
cracking attacks is still an unsolved problem, and our work addresses this challenge. Although the best way to determine how difficult it
may be to crack a user-selected password is to check its resistance to cracking attacks employed by attackers in the wild, implementing
such a strategy at an enterprise would be infeasible in practice. In this report we, first, formalize the concepts of password complexity
and strength with concrete definitions which emphasize their differences. Our definitions are quite general. They capture human biases
and many known techniques attackers use to recover stolen credentials in real life, such as brute-force attacks, mangled wordlist
attacks, as well as attacks that make use of Probabilistic Context Free Grammars, Markov Models, and Natural Language Processing.
Building on our definitions, we develop a general framework for calculating password complexity and strength that could be used in
practice. Our approach is based on the key insight that an attacker’s success at cracking a password must be defined by its available
computational resources, time, function used to store that password, as well as the topology that bounds that attacker’s search space
based on that attacker’s available inputs (prior knowledge), transformations it can use to tweak and explore its inputs, and the path of
exploration which can be based on the attacker’s perceived probability of success. We also provide a general framework for assessing
the accuracy of password complexity and strength estimators that can be used to compare other tools available in the wild. Finally, we
discuss how our framework can be used to assess procedures that rely on storing password-protected information.
Index Terms—Computer security, Password cracking, Password strength, Password complexity, Password entropy, Chain rule-based
password strength and complexity, Search space partition, Probability.
F
1 INTRODUCTION
Although many ideas have been proposed to replace
passwords, they are still considered to be the standard
authentication mechanism for such services as e-mail, social
networking, etc. However, password-based authentication
has been a notable weak point in cyber security despite
decades of effort. For example, in 2012, 76% of network in-
trusions exploited weak or stolen credentials (i.e., username
and/or password) [1]. Researchers and practitioners agree
that having good passwords is critical in many applications,
but users often choose bad passwords [2], [3]. A good pass-
word should have two key properties: (i) difficult to guess
by an adversary and (ii) easy to remember; users almost
always opt for the latter rather than the former [4].
So many services currently rely on password-based au-
thentication that even if password use were to ever become
uncommon, the transition to new authentication methods
is expected to be long and complicated. And so, passwords
This work is sponsored by the Department of the Air Force under Air Force
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have been the focal point of many studies in recent years.
These studies have explored a range of related topics in-
cluding password cracking algorithms [5]–[11], password
strength and complexity [12]–[17], user behavior with re-
spect to password selection [18]–[20], and password creation
policies [2], [3], [21]–[23]. In this report we focus on accurate
assessment of a password’s resistance to cracking attacks, a
problem that we believe still remains unsolved.
As suggested in [24], the first step in any security anal-
ysis is to define our goals and our considered threat model.
Thus, in this report we first formally define password
complexity and password strength. In our definitions, we
consider an attacker whose goal is to recover a password
that has been hidden by a particular protection function.
Informally, password complexity defines the usage of
allowed characters, length, and symmetry of a password.
However, in real life, attacker’s success is limited by its
computational resources, time, and prior knowledge as well
as how the password is stored. Password complexity does
not take such details into account, so in principle it cannot
provide an accurate estimate of how long it may take an
attacker to crack a password. Note, however, that password
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complexity is still a good indicator of how difficult it may
be to guess a password (i.e., how close it is to a random
string) when information about how the password is pro-
tected and/or attacker’s capabilities is not readily available.
Password strength on the other hand, does take such details
into account, and, thus, it is a more complete notion. It may,
however, be very difficult to estimate in practice because it
may be impossible to accurately capture changes of such
parameters as technological advances and any additional
auxiliary information available to the adversary with time.
Both password complexity and strength require under-
standing of attacker’s use of prior knowledge, which we
express in the form of a topology that bounds the attacker’s
search space. A topology is defined by the attacker’s knowl-
edge about the alphabet used to create the password, rules
that it can use to tweak and explore words created by that
alphabet, and the exploration path of the resultant search
space. The latter can be based on the attacker’s perceived
probability of success.
Our definitions are general as they capture human biases
and many known techniques attackers use to recover stolen
credentials in real life, such as brute-force attacks, mangled
wordlist attacks, as well as attacks that make use of Prob-
abilistic Context Free Grammars (PCFG), Markov Models,
and Natural Language Processing (NLP).
Using our definitions we develop a general framework
for calculating password complexity and strength that could
be used in practice. We believe our framework provides a
complete sense of security due to its extensive consideration
of how attackers crack passwords in the wild. To summa-
rize, the contributions of our study are as follows.
1) We formalize the concepts of password complexity
and password strength.
2) We propose a novel complexity measure that mod-
els current password attacks which leverage pass-
word “topologies,” i.e. dictionaries of words to-
gether with word-mangling rules and a specification
of the order in which rules are executed during an
attack.
3) We provide a framework for empirical evaluation
of password-strength and password-complexity es-
timators.
4) Finally, we discuss how our framework can be used
in general to assess any procedure that relis on
storing password-protected information.
The rest of this report is organized as follows. We in-
troduce important notation and definitions which are used
throughout the paper in Section 2. Section 3 formally defines
notions of password complexity and password strength, and
then discusses their key differences and implications. In
Section 4 we present the details of our rule-based approach
to calculate password complexity and strength, and we
conclude in Section 5.
2 PRELIMINARIES
In this section we introduce important notation and defini-
tions that will be used throughout the paper.
We define a finite alphabet α to be a finite set of
characters, and a password p to be a finite string over α.
We define the profinite set X(α) of all finite strings over
α as the set of all possible passwords over α. Note that
X({0, 1}) = {0, 1}∗ . We next define a password-generating
procedure that we call a rule.
Definition 1 (Rule). A rule, denoted by ξ, is a function ξ :
X(α) × {0, 1}∗ → 2X(α) that takes as input a finite alphabet α
together with a finite bit string aux and outputs a subset of X(α).
Here, aux is any auxiliary information that can be used
to describe password-policy requirements, e.g., password
minimum and maximum length, usage of capital letters and
numbers, etc.
We can view aux as a logical formula specifying the
requirements that users have to satisfy when selecting a
password. It follows that when at least two rules, ξi, ξj , . . . ,
are combined to produce a new rule, ξk, auxk must be
interpreted as auxk = auxi ∧ auxj ∧ . . . (i.e., the resulting
auxk should satisfy the requirements corresponding to auxi
and auxj and all other aux’s in this combination.)
Definition 2 (Rule Set). A rule set with respect to a rule ξ, de-
noted by {x1, x2, . . . }, is the combination of infinitely countable
passwords defined by a rule, ξ : X(α)× {0, 1}∗ → 2X(α) .
Definition 3 (Combination of Rules). The combination of
any finite set of rules Ξ = {ξ1, . . . , ξk} over some finite al-
phabets α1, . . . , αk ⊆ α is the union of the outputs of those
rules ∪ki=1(ξi(αi, auxi)) ⊆ X(α) for any auxiliary inputs
aux1, . . . , auxk.
It is important to emphasize that the union of rules
may consist of a single rule. Note that characters of aux
do not have to come from α. For simplicity, we require
that aux does not specify use of characters not in α. The
simplest example of a use of a rule is to generate all possible
passwords, or all possible English dictionary words with a
certain maximal length as defined in aux.
Definition 4 (Permutation of Rules). A permutation of any
finite set of rules Ξ = {ξ1, . . . , ξk} over some finite alphabets
α1, . . . , αk ⊆ α outputs a directed graph G = (V ⊆ Ξ, E ⊆
Ξ× Ξ) in which the edges impose a total ordering on the vertices
for any auxiliary inputs aux1, . . . , auxk.
Note that we use the permutation of rules and topology
interchangeably.
Definition 5 (Generatable). A finite string σ ∈ X(α) is
generatable by a union of rules Ξ = {ξ1, . . . , ξk}, if there exist
alphabets α1, . . . , αk ⊆ α and auxiliary inputs aux1, . . . , auxk
such that σ ∈ ∪ki=1(ξi(αi, auxi)).
Now, we define a password parsing, which is a parti-
tioning of a password into segments.
Definition 6 (Parsing). A parsing of a finite string σ ∈ X(α)
is a partition of its constituent characters in α.
We refer to the set of all parsings of a password p as [P ].
Definition 7 (Parsing Function). Parsing function Γ : Ξ×p→
[p] ⊆ [P ] conforms a union of rules Ξ = {ξ1, . . . , ξk} on a
password p and returns a list of parsings of p.
Note that if there is no predefined rule, Γ generates all
possible parsings of p.
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Now, we define a protection function that can be used to
transform and/or store a password as a string such that the
original password may be more difficult for an attacker to
recover.
Definition 8 (Protection Function). Protection function Fα 1
is a function Fα : X(α)→ {0, 1}∗ that takes a finite string over
α and outputs a bit string.
Definition 9 (Adversary). An adversary 2 is defined as a non-
deterministic algorithm.
We use Z(n) is negligible in a parameter n if ∃c, n0 ∈ R+
such that Z(n) < 1cn , ∀n > n0.
We denote a probability distribution with X . A specific
event in the distribution X is shown as x (i.e., x ∈ X .) The
probability that an event x takes a specific value, probx such
that 0 < probx ≤ 1. The sum of probx over all possible
values of x is 1,
∑N
i=1 probx = 1, where i represents the
event index and N denotes the total number of possible
events in X . We assume that every event x in X , ∀x ∈ X ,
is equally probable (i.e., X is uniformly distributed.) |X |
denotes the cardinality of X .
2.1 Example
In order to illustrate the above definitions, we provide the
following example. Suppose we define an alphanumeric
alphabet, α = {A − Z, a − z, 0 − 9}, with a password, p
as a finite string over α. We define three rules, ξ1(α, aux1),
ξ2(α, aux2), and ξ3(α, aux3) where aux1 is a bit string
that specifies passwords consisting of English dictionary
words with maximum length of 8 characters, aux2 is a
bit string that specifies passwords consisting of numeric
characters with a maximum length of 4, and aux3 specifies
any alphanumeric string of length l, where 1 ≤ l ≤ 8.
Rule set ξ1 = {p1, p2, . . . },∀i ∈ Z+ is a subset of X(α)
that includes 1−to−8 character dictionary words , e.g. hello,
Goodbye, etc. Rule set ξ2 = {p1′, p2′, . . . },∀i ∈ Z+ is a subset
of X(α) that includes 1−to−4 character strings of digits, e.g.
0011, 555, etc. Rule set ξ3 = {p1′′, p2′′, . . . },∀i ∈ Z+ is a
subset of X(α) that includes 1−to−8 character strings of
letters or digits, e.g. a1b2c3, zzz3, etc.
A combination of the above three rules Ξ1 = {ξ1, ξ2, ξ3}
is the union of rule outputs, ∪3i=1(ξi(αi, auxi)) ⊆ X(α)
and includes passwords from all three rule sets above. A
permutation of Ξ1 = {ξ1, ξ2, ξ3} gives a directed graph, G1
in which the edges impose an ordering of the rules, e.g.
(ξ2, ξ1, ξ3). The password, p = password, is generatable by
rule combination, Ξ1, because p ∈ ∪3i=1(ξi(αi, auxi)). Note
that password, p′ = password1, is not generatable by Ξ1 as
it is not an element of the union of rule sets ξ1, ξ2, ξ3.
An example parsing of p′′ = psword1 is p|s|word1. A
parsing function, Γ(Ξ1, p′′), conforms the rule combination,
Ξ1 on p′′ to produce a list of parsings [p′′]. Example parsings
from [p′′] include ps|word|1, ps|wo|rd1, etc.
A protection function Fα can be any one-way function
that inputs a string (password) and outputs a bit string from
which it is difficult to recover the original input string. Ex-
ample protection functions include common hash functions
1. We will drop the subscript when it is clear which alphabet is being
considered.
2. We use an adversary and an attacker interchangeably.
such as MD5 or SHA-1. Finally, an adversary is represented
as a non-deterministic password guessing algorithm, e.g. a
guessing algorithm which tries dictionary words up to 8
characters in length at random and, upon exhausting all
such words, tries random numbers between 1 and 1000.
3 PASSWORD COMPLEXITY AND STRENGTH
In this section we formally define notions of password
complexity and password strength, and we then discuss
their key differences and implications.
3.1 Defining Password Complexity
Recall that a password p is just a finite string of characters
that come from some particular finite alphabet α. We define
complexity of a given password over some alphabet in the
context of a set of rules.
Definition 10 (Complexity). Complexity of a password p,
over some alphabet α, with respect to a finite set of rules
Ξ = {ξ1, ξ2, . . . , ξk} is defined as the size of the smallest subset of
X(α) containing p that can be generated with any combination of
rules in Ξ over α, with any auxiliary inputs. If no combination of
rules in Ξ can generate a set that contains p, then p’s complexity
is the cardinality of X(α).
Notice that this definition requires specification of an
alphabet and rules. This is done to capture the question of
how hard it may be for an attacker to guess a password with
its own set of rules and dictionaries, knowing the password
policy requirements used to generate that password. Pre-
vious entropy-based password complexity measures were
not adequate because they did not provide the means for
specifying the appropriate password search space based on
precisely this kind of information, i.e., rules and dictionaries
that attackers may be using. Def. 10 also captures the sce-
nario when the attacker has no information about password
policies and cannot generate the password with any of its
rules and dictionaries, in which case this password may be
as good as a random finite string.
3.2 Defining Password Strength
We define password strength with respect to the following
security experiment ExpFAT-sec involving an adversary A.
Definition 11 (FAT-Security Experiment). The inputs to FAT-
experiment are an alphabet α, a protection function F associated
with α, the description of adversary A, a password p over α, and
a time period T . Description of an adversary A includes all of its
computational resources, its rules, and any auxiliary information.
A takes as input α, F , p, T , and any additional random input.
The security experiment ends either after A outputs a finite string
p′ or the time after the experiment starts exceeds T , which ever
comes first. ExpFAT-sec (α, F , A, T , p) returns one if, within time
T after its start A outputs a finite string p′ such that F (p′) =
F (p). ExpFAT-sec (α, F , A, T , p) returns zero otherwise.
We now define our security definition with respect to the
FAT-experiment we just described.
Definition 12 (Password FAT-Strength). We say that a pass-
word p over an alphabet α is FAT-secure if over all random inputs
to A, ExpFAT-sec(α, F, A, T, p) returns 0 in expectation.
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Note that by providing an adversary with any auxiliary
information this definition captures an attacker’s potential
knowledge of the policies under which the input password
was selected as well as how it could steal a multitude
of additional protected passwords. The key aspect of this
definition is that it requires us to consider attacker’s capa-
bilities as well as the protection function used to store the
password. This is something that has not been captured by
any previous password strength or complexity measures,
with the exception of passfault [17].
passfault is Time-To-Crack (TTC) estimator that takes into
account attacker’s capabilities including rules and password
protection function. However, it is dependent on a fixed set
of rules and a fixed methodology for parsing passwords.
Also, it does not capture attacker’s order of rule application,
nor does it take into account advances in technology and
any additional auxiliary information. We describe how to
address these shortcomings later in the paper.
Note that password complexity does not take into ac-
count how the password is stored, nor attackers’ capabili-
ties. Thus, it cannot intrinsically provide an estimate of how
long it may take anyone to crack a password. However, it
is a good indicator of how difficult it may be to guess a
password (i.e., how close it is to a random string) when
information about protection function or attacker’s capabil-
ities is not clear (the most typical scenario when users are
asked to select a password for a particular website).
Password strength on the other hand, does take such
details into account, and, thus, it it is more complete. How-
ever, password strength may be very difficult to estimate
realistically because it may be impossible to accurately cap-
ture changes of such parameters as technological advances
and any additional auxiliary information available to the
adversary with time. Any such extra information can in
principle be encapsulated as auxiliary information within
the description of the adversary, and we propose how this
can be done later in the paper.
3.3 Evaluating Password Strength Estimators
To truly evaluate a password-strength estimator one must
compare its estimates with respect to real password-
cracking attacks. However, this may be infeasible in practice
due to lack of proper equipment and time.
Although, for the purposes of empirical evaluation, well-
known password-cracking tools such as John the Ripper
(JtR) and Hashcat [25] can in principle be run on commodity
hardware [26], their performance will not do justice to
attackers’ capabilities in the wild.
Even when appropriate password-cracking hard-
ware [27] is available, there may not be enough time. For
example, it is impractical to wait for a year to see if a
password may really require that long to be recovered.
In that time attackers’ capabilities are likely to improve,
and the password-strength estimator under test is likely to
undergo significant updates. To address the timing issue,
one could focus on passwords that cannot be broken within
a smaller, more practical amount of time T (e.g., 4 weeks).
In this context we consider the following two main criteria
for evaluating password-strength estimators:
• Reliability The estimator does not create a false
sense security in the sense that it marks weak pass-
words as strong.
• Inclusion The estimator does not reduce the space
of passwords considered to be strong by marking
strong passwords as weak.
Intuitively, we do not want an estimator to overestimate
or underestimate password strength. We now present defi-
nitions that make up a framework for evaluating password-
strength estimators.
Definition 13 (FAT-Strength Estimator). A password FAT-
strength estimator E is a function that takes as input alphabet
α, a protection function F associated with α, the description of
adversary A, a password p over α, a time period T , and any
additional information AUX, and outputs
• 1, in which case we say that E marks p as FAT-secure, or
• 0, in which case we say thatE marks p as not FAT-secure.
Definition 14 (Password FAT-Strength Estimator Reliabil-
ity). We say that a password FAT-strength estimator E over an
alphabet α is reliable over a test set P ⊆ X(α), if the fraction
of P that E marks as FAT-secure that are not FAT-secure is
negligible in |P |.
Definition 15 (Password FAT-Strength Estimator Inclusion).
We say that a password FAT-strength estimator E over an alpha-
bet α is inclusive over a test set P ⊆ X(α), if the fraction of P
that E marks as not FAT-secure that are FAT-secure is negligible
in |P |.
Definition 16 (Password FAT-Strength Estimator Accuracy).
We say that a password FAT-strength estimator E over an
alphabet α is accurate over a test set P ⊆ X(α), if it is both
reliable and inclusive with respect to P .
3.4 Discussions:
We propose a general framework using all possible types of
password cracking attacks to calculate a password’s com-
plexity and strength. In this section, we describe a couple
of examples how our framework can be used to capture
different types of password cracking attacks.
3.4.1 Probabilistic context-free grammar:
In this rule, an attacker uses a large set of passwords from
major password breaches to train his password generation
model [7]. The attacker then uses the trained model to create
a rule set that is used to generate a context-free grammar
strings to crack a password. Our framework imitates the
attacker’s password cracking strategy during the calculation
of the password’s complexity and strength.
3.4.2 Password cracking informed by online presence:
In this rule, an attacker scrapes the social network websites
(e.g., Facebook, LinkedIn, etc.) of a user to extract possible
phrases from structured/unstructured text, pictures, videos
etc. which can be used to derive a password. These phrases
can be combined with possible rule sets (e.g., word list) to
create a combination of rules. The attacker probably knows
the alphabet associated with the password that the attacker
is trying to crack. If he does not know the alphabet, he
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Fig. 1. Our rule-based framework takes a password p and other aux as inputs and then outputs p’s complexity and strength. Orange is input to our
framework and blue represents internal functions.
can try different alphabets or all ASCII characters. Finally,
the attacker can explore all possible passwords by using
different dictionaries (e.g., if the user’s Facebook page has
posts in English and French, the attacker can use these
both dictionaries.) Our framework mimics the attacker’s
password cracking strategy to calculate the password’s com-
plexity and strength.
4 OUR RULE-BASED APPROACH
In this section, we present the details of our rule-based
approach which uses the combinations of upper bound,
lower bound, chain rule, and order-aware chain rule to
calculate the complexity and strength of a password, p.
Unlike other schemes [16] [13] [14], our framework provides
more complete sense of security for a user while creating a
password in X(α).
4.1 Complexity and Strength Calculation Framework
General architecture of our rule-based password complexity
and strength framework is shown in Fig. 1. It takes a pass-
word p as an input. A user can also provide a subset or entire
Ξ, α, the minimum and maximum allowable length of p,
strength parameters (e.g., password storage and adversarial
capabilities), and order of rules. It outputs η, FAT−strength
estimate (i.e., 0 or 1), and normalized complexity of p in
relation to lower and upper bounds of complexity. Note
that all inputs (orange boxes in the Fig. 1) are optional. The
default parser extracts parsings of p and it has three options:
(i) using the default algorithms p→ [P ], (ii) using the user-
defined algorithms p → [p] ⊆ [P ], and (iii) locating p in
precalculated set of all possible passwords based on the
input rules. The output of the default parser is either a list
of parsed results of p or a corresponding point of p in X(α).
The complexity calculator takes the default parser’s output as
an input. It may either calculate the complexity of p based
on the provided parsings or use pre-calculated Ξ and then
map p into the minimum search space (i.e., complexity.) The
complexity calculator outputs complexity and normalized
complexity of p. The FAT−strength calculator output is
binary. H1 means FAT− strength calculator outputs 1 and
H0 means FAT− strength calculator outputs 0.
4.2 Understanding Password Complexity
In this section, we provide details of our framework and
mathematical proofs to support our approach and also show
that our rule-based complexity and strength calculation
yields a sense of security for a given password p.
The password entropy [28] is commonly used to indicate
a measure of protection provided by p and increases with
the number of characters. The size of the all possible pass-
words with alphabet α, X(α), identifies the complexity for
randomly generated passwords. The larger the password
search space, the more difficult password is to crack by
brute-force attack.
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Let us provide a couple of numerical examples to high-
light some details of α, X(α), and adversaries perspec-
tive on |X(α)|. Assume that we want to create an eight-
character password and the alphabet has only lower case
English letters (i.e., ξ : α = {lower-case English letters} ×
aux = {no more than eigth letters} → 2X(α)). There are
more than 200 billion possible ways to create a password
p, |X(α : lower case english letters)| = 268. If an attacker
knows the allowed length of p and that the password only
uses lower-case letters, at a rate of thousands to trillions
password attempts per second, it could take 2 × 108 to 0.2
seconds, respectively to crack the password by using brute
force. Note that the rate of attempt to guess a password
widely varies because of adversaries hardware capabilities.
It might be primitive software on out-dated hardware for
an everyday attacker or a dedicated infrastructure with
state-of-art software algorithms for a state-sponsored cyber
team. If we augment the alphabet with upper case letters,
there are two orders of magnitude more possible ways than
lower-case only passwords. When α has lower-case letters
with eight-character passwords, there are 26 times more
possible ways than lower-case letters with nine-character
passwords (i.e., α = {lower-case English letters} × aux =
{no more than nine letters} → 2X(α)). These examples high-
light how the size of all possible passwords, |X(α)|, changes
with respect to the number of allowed length and alphabet.
Fig. 2 shows various combinations of lower/upper-case
letters (i.e., α = {lower- and upper-case English letters} ×
aux = {number of letters is ` ∈ [6, 15]} → 2X(α)) and
password length versus the number of different ways to
create a password in log scale.
Fig. 2. Complexity of X(α) increases with |α| and allowed password
length.
4.3 More Information Leads to Higher Predictability
In this section, we establish mathematical ground to con-
struct our rule-based complexity and strength calculation.
Our goal is to prove that information accumulation about a
user’s password increases the predictability of the password
by an adversary as we show in the following theorem.
Theorem 1 (Information Gain). When an adversary A gains
more information about the possible password space X(α), the
complexity of a password decreases.
To prove this theorem, we need to prove the following
lemmas.
As given in Definitions 1 and 2, a rule set ξi =
{xi1, xi2, . . . }, where ∀i ∈ Z+, is a subset of X(α). The
following lemma shows that combination of any number
of rules results in a rule which is a subset of X(α).
Lemma 1 (Union). Any combinations of n rules ξ1, . . . , ξn
results in a rule ξk whose corresponding rule set ξk is ξ1 ∪ ξ2 ∪
· · · ∪ ξn ⊆ X(α),∀n ∈ [2,∞).
Proof. We prove this lemma by induction,
ξ1 ∪ ξ2 ∪ · · · ∪ ξn = ξk ⇒ ξk ⊆ X(α),∀n ∈ [2,∞) (1)
Base case: Let |n| = 2 such that ξi ∪ ξj = ξk ⊆
X(α). Assume that we have two rule sets ξi and
ξj and they operate on the alphabets αi, αj ⊆ α
and auxi, auxj , respectively. ξi(αi, auxi) and ξj(αj , auxj)
generate {xi1, xi2, . . . } and {xj1, xj2, . . . }, respectively.
ξi(αi, auxi), ξj(αh, auxj) ⊆ X(α) ⇒ {xi1, xi2, . . . } ∪
{xj1, xj2, . . . } ⊆ {xi1, xi2, . . . , xj1, xj2, . . . } and the cardi-
nality of the union rule set |{xi1, xi2, . . . , xj1, xj2, . . . }| ≤
|{xi1, xi2, . . . }|+ |{xj1, xj2, . . . }|. Note that |ξk| is less than
and equal to |ξi| + |ξj | = |X(αi) × auxi| + |X(αj) × auxj |
since any given rule set is not necessarily proper subset of
X(α).
ξk is the combination of these two rule sets such that
ξi(αi, auxi)∪ ξj(αj , auxj) = ξk : X(αi ∪αj ⊆ α)× (auxi ∧
auxj) ⇒ ξk = {xi1, . . . , xik, xj1, . . . , xjl} ⊆ X(α). We can
claim that the union of two rule sets results in a rule set in a
profinite set X(α).
Inductive hypothesis: Let ∀n ∈ [2,∞) be given
and suppose Eqn. 1 is true for n = q. Suppose
that q rule sets ξ1, . . . , ξq operate on the alphabets
α1, . . . , αq ⊆ α and aux1, . . . , auxq , respectively.
ξ1(α1, aux1), ξ2(α2, aux2), . . . , and ξq(αq, auxq)
generate {x11, x12, . . . }, . . . , {xq1, xq2, . . . }, respec-
tively. ξi(α1, aux1), . . . , ξq(αq, auxq) ⊆ X(α) ⇒
{x11, x12 . . . } ∪ {x21, x22, . . . } ∪ · · · ∪ {xq1, xq2, . . . } ⊆
{x11, x12, . . . , xq1, xq2, . . . } and the cardinality of
the union rule set |{x11, x12, . . . , xq1, xq2, . . . }| ≤
|{x11, x12, . . . }| + |{x21, x22, . . . }| + · · · + |xq1, xq2, . . . |.
Note that |ξk| is less than and equal to |ξ1|+ |ξ2|+ · · ·+ |ξq|
since any given rule set is not necessarily proper subset of
X(α).
Induction step: Let use the assumptions from
Induction step - 1 and show that the result holds for
n = (q + 1). ξ1(α1, aux1), ξ2(α2, aux2), . . . , ξq(αq, auxq),
and ξq+1(αq+1, auxq+1) generate {x11, x12, . . . }, . . . ,
{xq1, xq2, . . . }, {x(q+1)1, x(q+1)2, . . . }, respectively.
ξi(α1, aux1),. . . ,ξq(αq, auxq), ξ(q+1)(α(q+1), aux(q+1))
⊆ X(α) ⇒ {x11, x12 . . . } ∪{x21, x22, . . . }
∪ · · · ∪ {xq1, xq2, . . . } ∪{x(q+1)1, x(q+1)2, . . . }
⊆ {x11, x12, . . . , xq1, xq2, . . . , x(q+1)1, x(q+1)2, . . . }
and the cardinality of the union rule set
|{x11, x12, . . . , xq1, xq2, . . . , x(q+1)1, x(q+1)2, . . . }| ≤
|{x11, x12, . . . }| + |{x21, x22, . . . }| + · · · + |xq1, xq2, . . . | +
|x(q+1)1, x(q+1)2, . . . |. Note that |ξk| is less than and equal
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to |ξ1| + |ξ2| + · · · + |ξq| + |ξ(q+1)| since any given rule set
is not necessarily proper subset of X(α).
Conclusion: By the principle of induction, Eqn. 1 is true
∀n ∈ [2,∞).
Let us give an example for Lemma 1 to give insight
about the meaning of union of two rules. Assume that we
have two rules such that ξ1 represents the rule of dictionary
words and ξ2 is the numbers from zero to nine. Passwords
only composed of dictionary words are in ξ1 and passwords
with numbers are in ξ2. When we combine these rules,
ξ1 ∪ ξ2, the resulting rule ξ3 represents passwords with
dictionary words and numbers in X(α).
Now, let us prove that X(α) can be partitioned.
Lemma 2 (Countably Infinite). Profinite password search space
X(α) can be partitioned into a countably infinite set ξ1, ξ2, . . .
such that X(α) = ∪∞j=1ξj where ξj represents a rule or a
combination of rules.
Proof. X(α) is defined as a set of all finite strings over an
alphabet α, (see Section 2.) Suppose that we have set of
rules, we will now present a procedure to transform this set
into a disjoint set of the rules. To show X(α) = ∪∞j=1ξj , it is
sufficient by producing one-to-one map f : ∪∞i=1bi → 2X(α),
where ∪∞i=1bi is a pairwise disjoint countable (i.e., countably
infinite) set and ∪∞j=1ξj = ∪∞i=1bi as follows:
b1 = ξ1
b2 = ξ2 − ξ1
b3 = ξ3 − (ξ1 ∪ ξ2)
.
.
.
bn = ξn − (ξ1 ∪ ξ2 ∪ · · · ∪ ξn−1)
.
.
.
To see bis are pairwise disjoint: let us consider bn and bm,
where n < m. If x ∈ bm, bm = ξm − (ξ1 ∪ ξ2 ∪ · · · ∪ ξm−1).
This implies that x /∈ bn, bn = ξn − (ξ1 ∪ ξ2 ∪ · · · ∪ ξn−1).
Thus, bn ∩ bm = ∅.
Let us prove that ∪∞i=1bi = ∪∞j=1ξj . Since bn ⊆ ξn, we
certainly have ∪∞i=1bi ⊆ ∪∞j=1ξj . Conversely, if x ∈ ∪∞j=1ξj ,
it means that x is in at least one of ξn’s. Assume that x ∈ ξk,
where ξk is the smallest set that x can be a member of. Then
x ∈ bk. We know that x /∈ (ξ1 ∪ · · · ∪ ξk−1) so it can be
discarded in the definition of bk. x ∈ ∪∞i=1bi, thus, ∪∞i=1bi =
∪∞j=1ξj .
Let us define a function f such that f : ∪∞i=1bi →
X(α) ⇒ if x ∈ bi, then f : σ(x) ∈ X(α) as given in
Definition 5. For ∀x ∈ ∪∞i=1bi, there is exactly one σ since bi’s
are piecewise disjoint as shown above. This means that there
is no ambiguity in f ’s definition. We can claim that f : σ(x)
is one-to-one. ξ1, ξ2, . . . is countable since ∪∞i=1bi = ∪∞i=1ξi.
Thus, X(α) can be partitioned into a countably infinite sets
such that ∪∞i=1bi = ∪∞j=1ξj → X(α).
Let us define the advantage of an adversary A in guessing
a password p as the difference between probabilities of A
guessing p with and without prior knowledge.
Lemma 3 (Prior Knowledge). If a password p has a parsing
[p] ⊆ [P ], the complexity of p decreases when an attacker A has
prior knowledge.
Proof. As shown in Lemma 2, X(α) can be disjoint into
countably infinite subsets. Assume that prior knowledge
is denoted by X(α′), where α′ ⊆ α. Regardless of the
alphabets α and α′, X(α) \ X(α′) = ξk, where k ∈ Z+ and
|ξk| ≥ 1.
Let us consider a scenario in which |ξk| = 1, ξk :
(α, auxk) = {pk}. In other words, an attacker knows that
pk 6= p. Therefore, |X(α′)| < |X(α)| since | ∪∞i=1 (ξi)| −
| ∪∞i=1,i6=k (ξi)| = |ξk| = 1.
The minimal knowledge an attacker A can have about
a password p is that p 6∈ X(α′). Without prior knowl-
edge, the password p can be guessed with a probability of
probp∈X(α) = 1|X(α)| . With prior knowledge (i.e., excluding
ξk), the password p can be guessed with a probability
of probp∈X(α′) = 1|X(α′)| =
1
|X(α)|−|ξk| ⇒ probp∈X(α) <
probp∈X(α′). Therefore, we can conclude that the complexity
of p decreases when there is prior knowledge.
Let us recall Theorem 1 which states that the smaller
the search space X(α) the smaller is the complexity of a
password p.
Theorem 1 (Information Gain). The complexity of a password
p decreases when an adversary A gains more information.
Proof. As shown in Lemma 3, an adversary has an advan-
tage when there is prior knowledge. Assume that X(α′)
and X(α′′) represent subsets of X(α) such that X(α′) =
∪∞i=1,i6=k(ci) and X(α′′) = ∪∞i=1,i6=k,l(ξi), respectively. By
definition α′′ ⊆ α′ ⊆ α. Regardless of the size of
the subsets ξk and ξl and all three alphabets (α, α′, α′′),
|X(α′′)| < |X(α′)| < |X(α)| ⇒ probp∈X(α′′) > probp∈X(α′) >
probp∈X(α) as proven in Lemma 3. Thus, we conclude that
more prior information means smaller search space and the
complexity of a password decreases.
4.4 Rule-based Complexity Lower and Upper Bounds
Password complexity depends on the password-design pro-
cess and maximum complexity is achieved when each pass-
word character is independently drawn from uniformly
distributed alphabet analogous to the result which shows
the maximum entropy is achieved under the same condi-
tions [29]. The following lemma shows that independently
drawn samples from uniformly distributed alphabet pro-
vide the maximum search space cardinality among all other
distributions supporting the same alphabet.
Lemma 4 (Uniformly Distributed - 1). The maximum com-
plexity of a password p ∈ ξ(α, aux) is obtained if and only if
each character in p is pulled from a uniformly distributed input
set.
Proof. As defined in Section 2, a password p is a finite string
over α. Thus, let us assume that
1) p is composed of a finite number of strings such
that p = {l1, l2, . . . , ln}, where |p| = n and n ∈ Z+
is finite.
2) The probabilities of p = {l1, l2, . . . , ln} is a set
of positive real numbers {prob1, prob2, . . . , probn},
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such that li corresponds to probi. Note that∑n
i=1(probi) = 1.
We can use the inequality of arithmetic and geometric
means (AM-GM inequality) [30] to prove this lemma. AM-
GM inequality states that the arithmetic mean of a list of
non-negative real numbers is greater than or equal to the
geometric mean of the same list. prob1+prob2+···+probnn ≥
(prob1 × prob2 · · · × probn)1/n ⇒ 1n ≥ (prob1 × prob2 · · · ×
probn)
1/n⇒ 1nn ≥ 1(prob1×prob2···×probn) . The equality holds
if and only if ∀probi, i ∈ [1, n] are equal. Thus, if each
password character should be pulled from a uniformly
distributed input set to obtain maximum complexity.
The following lemma show that the maximum complex-
ity of a password p can be obtained if and only if each
password in X(α) is equally likely.
Lemma 5 (Uniformly Distributed - 2). The maximum com-
plexity of a randomly created password in X(α) is obtained if and
only if X(α) = {p1, p2, . . . , pn} is uniformly distributed for any
finite n ∈ Z+.
Proof. We prove this lemma by using Def. 10 and Theo. 1.
The complexity is defined as a size of the smallest subset
of X(α) in Def. 10. Theo. 1 shows that when an adversary
A gains more information about X(α), the complexity of p
decreases.
Let us assume that all passwords are generated by the
same set of rules but p1 (i.e., ξ1(α1 ⊆ α, aux1) → {p1}
and ξ2(α2 ⊆ α, aux2) → {p2, . . . , pn}) and the probabil-
ities of correctly guessing passwords by an adversary are
{prob1, prob2, . . . , probn}, where a probability of guessing a
password pi corresponds to probi. The relationship between
the probabilities as prob1 6= prob2 = prob3 = prob4 =
· · · = probn and
∑n
i=1(probi) = 1. The complexity of any
password created by ξ1 and ξ2 are |ξ1| and |ξ2|, respectively
(see Def. 10.) The complexity of X(α), |X(α)|, is strictly
greater than the complexities of ξ1,|ξ1|, and ξ2,|ξ2|, since
there is an injective function, but no bijective function, from
X(α) to ξ1 and ξ2. The reason is that p1 is not created by
ξ2 and the rest of the possible passwords (i.e., {p2, . . . , pn})
are not generated by ξ1. If a password p 6∈ ξ1, then the
probability of pis 1|ξ2| >
1
|X(α) |.
Thus, the maximum complexity can be obtained only all
passwords in X(α) created by a rule requiring all guessing
probabilities of passwords are equally likely.
Let us first calculate the upper bound for a password
p. The password-policy requirements generally provide the
minimum password length, denoted by k and alphabet α.
The maximum password length can be defined in the policy
or we can get the length of the longest password, denoted by
l, from a password database storing the existing passwords
or just length of the maximum password (see Fig. 1.) The
upper bound for our rule-based complexity is calculated as:
ηupper = |
l∑
i=k
(α)i| (2)
ηupper is |X(α)| (i.e., the cardinality of all possible pass-
words) and the upper bound is the same for any rule in
the set of rules and a disjoint set ξi (see in Lemma 3) of
X(α).
The following equation provides a lower bound
(ηlower/ξ(p)) on an adversary’s effort to guess a password
p based on our rule-based complexity measure:
ηlower/ξ(p) =

min(|ξ1|, . . . , |ξN |, . . . ),
∃|ξi| is bounded
ηupper otherwise,
(3)
where i ∈ [Z+. When a password p is not part of a given
rule set ξi, then for the lower bound calculation |ξi| → ∞.
As shown in Eq. 3, ηlower/ξ(p) may have one of two
possible outcomes. If a password is not a member of Ξ,
the lower and upper bounds are equal. The complexity of
p equals to |ξi| when the password is a part of the corre-
sponding rule set, ξi. Note that p can possibly be generated
by more than one rule and then its complexity is the smallest
cardinality of the all these rules.
4.5 Chain Rule Provides Complexity of Passwords Hav-
ing Composite Structures
The chain rule considers the case when there is more than
one pattern in a password p and an adversary A needs to
use the combination of rules to crack the password.
Due to the improved password-policies and richer al-
phabets, passwords generally have multipart structures
such as combination of upper-case letters, lower-case letters,
numbers, and characters. We define the rules as a part
of X(α) (see Definition 1 and Lemmas 1-2) and a rule
generally represents a small portion of X(α). For example,
if α is lower-case english letters and numbers from zero
to nine, a rule of dictionary words only represents a small
portion of X(α). Thus, it is expected that passwords are
generally the combination of various rules. The calculation
of the complexity should reflect an accumulation of these
small search spaces defined by the combination of rules (see
Def. 3) and/or a rule as shown below:
ηlower/c(p) =

min(|(c1)|, . . . , |cr|, . . . ),
if ∃|cr| is bounded
ηupperotherwise,
(4)
where c represents all possible combinations of rules in Ξ
and r ∈ Z+. We assume that if a password p is not a member
of a subset ci, then |ci| → ∞, where i ∈ Z+. For example,
ci might be a rule of dictionary words (dict.) or it might
be a combination of two rules such as the first character
of a password is a number and the rest of a password is
dictionary words (e.g., 1︸︷︷︸
Number
Love︸ ︷︷ ︸
Dict.
Soccer︸ ︷︷ ︸
Dict.
)
4.6 Password Parsing Provides More Accurate Com-
plexity Calculation
Brute-force (or exhaustive search) attack is the last resort for
cracking a password since it is the least efficient method. It
requires to systematically try all the combinations. Brute-
force always cracks a password when there is no time
constraint. Furthermore, if a password has a predictable
structure, it makes exhaustive search feasible. As explained
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up to here, our main goal is to provide better sense of
security for a user. Therefore, we want to be conservative
with the rule-based complexity calculation. To provide bet-
ter feedback to a user, our rule-based complexity engine
parses the given password to extract various patterns.
A user can use default and/or a user-defined password
parsing mechanism in order to extract patterns in a given
password (see Fig. 1.) The parser uses an alphabet, which
might be the parser specific or the common alphabet that
our rule-based password complexity engine uses, to extract
the patterns in a given password. Assume that a parser
uses lower and upper case english letters and digits from
zero to nine as an alphabet (ω = 26 + 26 + 10 = 62) to
extract the patterns with number only and three consecutive
letters in a password. The input 1LoveSoccer can be parsed
as a number of different ways such as 1-Love-Soccer, 1-Lov-
eSoccer, 1-LoveS-occer, etc. Our rule-based complexity engine
compares all these parsed results with a given rule and
find the minimum search space to calculate the complexity
of the password. For example, if we have two separate
rules, namely digits (ξ1) and 20K dictionary words (ξ2),
to check these parsed passwords, all extracted patterns are
compared to these rules to calculate password complexity.
Let us look at password 1-Love-Soccer. ξ1 provides 10 for
1 (see Section 4.5), and ∞ for both Love and Soccer and ξ2
gives ∞ for 1, and 20K for both Love and Soccer. For the
purpose of readability, we use log scale for the following
calculations. Thus, ρ(I−Love−Soccer) = log2(10 × 20K ×
20K) = 31.8974. Now, let us calculate the complexity for
1-Lov-eSoccer. ξ1 provides ∞ for all 1, Lov, and eSoccer and
ξ2 gives 10 for 1, and ∞ for both Lov and eSoccer. Thus,
ρ(I−Lov−eSoccer) = min(log2(62 × 623 × 627), log2(10 ×
623 × 627)) = 65.4962 (see Section 4.5.) After calculating
all parsed result, the complexity of the password ILoveSoc-
cer is min = (ρ(I−Love−Soccer), ρ(I−Lov−eSoccer), . . . ) =
ρ(I−Love−Soccer) = 31.8974.
4.7 Order-Aware Chain Rule Complexity
In brute-force cracking, an attacker tries every possible
string in X(α) until it succeeds. More common methods
of password cracking, such as dictionary attacks, pattern
checking, word list substitution, etc. attempt to reduce the
number of trials required and will usually be attempted
before exhastutive search. In other words, there are probable
paths that an attacker can try to recover a password before
trying all combinations in X(α). If we have an idea of these
probable paths such as an attacker checks dictionary words
before word list substitution, our rule-based engine can
incorporate this information into the complexity calculation
as shown below:
η(p) = min(ηupper, (|ξi|+ |ξj |+ · · ·+ |ξk|)) (5)
where p is generatable by ξk and an attackerA tries ξi before
ξj , ξj before ξk and so on. ∀ξi ∈ X(α), i ∈ Z+.
Fig. 3 presents an example of a permutation of rules.
In this scenario, the directed graph has three nodes and
two edges, G = (V1, E1), where V1 = (ξi, ξj , ξk), E1 =
(aij , ajk), and aij = (ξi, ξj), ajk = (ξj , ξk). As defined in
Def. 4 and formulated in Eq. 5, the order of evaluation of a
password p ∈ X(α)’s complexity is ξi, xij , and then ξk.
When there is no idea about the order of rules, the
complexity calculations can use the minimum of all possible
orders to provide a lower bound to a user as shown below:
ηlower(p) = min{ηupper, |
(
Ξ
i
)
|i=[1,∞)} (6)Refined with Spline
ξi	  
ξj	  
ξk	  
aij	  
ajk	  
Fig. 3. An example of a permutation of rules (see Defn. 4) shown as a di-
rected graph G such that G = (V1, E1), where V1 = (ξi, ξj , ξk), E1 =
(aij , ajk), and aij = (ξi, ξj), ajk = (ξj , ξk).
4.8 Password FAT-Strength
Password FAT-strength is a calculation of the effectiveness
of a password in resisting guessing and brute-force attacks.
To ensure an acceptable level of security, our framework
provides FAT-strength of a password defined in Def. 12.
Most of the password strength meters categorize a pass-
word as very weak, weak, strong, and very strong [31]. They
do not use the estimated time-to-crack (except passfault),
an adversary’s computational power, or the user’s online
presence. However, the estimation of a password strength
should be a function of endurance to brute-force attack. Our
hypothesis given in Eq. 7 uses the factors that can be used
by an adversary to calculate a password’s FAT-strength. For
example, one or more rules can be extracted from a user’s
online presence (e.g., facebook account). When a user creates
a password using personal information that is publicly
available, our framework has the ability to incorporate this
customized information into the set of rules Ξ.
If p ∈ ξi, then our FAT-strength calculation will include
this information in the cardinality of the complexity as given
below:
F × s(t)× 1
µp(t)
× |η| H1≷
H0
T (7)
where F is a function of a type of password storage (e.g.,
one-way hash function), s(t) is the computation power used
by an adversary to crack a password p, µp(t) is the number
of parallel processors, and T shows the acceptable time-
to-crack that can be defined by a user or calculated from
password change policy. H1 represents FAT -strong p and
H0 represents a scenario in which p is not FAT -strong. Note
that the computational power s(t) is a function of time since
it incorporates Moore’s law (see Table 1) into account while
calculation the FAT-strength.
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TABLE 1
Expected changes in the relative computing power based on Moore’s
law
Year Relative Computing Power
2015 1 x
2025 32 x
2035 1024 x
2045 32768 x
Fig. 4 shows a high-level model of FAT-strength cal-
culation given in Eq. 7. Strength framework uses pass-
word protection methods, F , and the expected life time
of p, T , as auxiliary parameters. Imagine that certain rules
ξi,∀i ∈ [1, n] and computational power s(t) can be modeled
as an adversarial capabilities. s(t) follows the Moore’s law
(i.e., an adversary’s computational capacity doubles every
other year); however, it can also be fed into the strength
framework as a different function. For example, if an adver-
sary is a known-state actor and improves its computation
capacity every month, this information can be incorporated
into s(t). The complexity framework provides the cardinal-
ity of an estimated complexity of p. As explained in previous
sections, various number of complexities are calculated by
our framework. |η| is the minimum of all calculations if a
user does not enforce a certain complexity calculation (e.g.,
order aware chain rule complexity.) The strength framework
uses the binary test of hypothesis to decide between H1 and
H0 which indicates whether p is FAT -strong or not.
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Fig. 4. FAT-strength hypothesis testing given in Eq. 7 uses adversary
model, user-defined variables (e.g., F and T ), and complexity of p.
5 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we formalize the concepts of password com-
plexity and password strength and propose a novel ap-
proach to calculate password strength and complexity while
providing a general framework for analyzing/comparing
other available password strength/complexity estimators.
Our framework incorporated human biases into our calcu-
lation so that lower-bound of a password strength and com-
plexity can be provided to a user. The key insight we employ
is that a brute-force attacker does not assume all guesses
are equally likely, so one should not assume all possible
passwords are equally good. As a result, our framework to
calculating password strength and complexity uses the idea
that some guesses are far better than others since human-
based password choices are not random. Furthermore, our
approach can easily be generalized to accommodate other
methods for storing secret information and authenticating
identities and/or accounts.
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